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An Effective Procedure for Computing
“Uncomputable” Functions∗
Kurt Ammon†
Abstract
We give an effective procedure that produces a natural number in
its output from any natural number in its input, that is, it computes a
total function. The elementary operations of the procedure are Turing-
computable. The procedure has a second input which can contain the
Go¨del number of any Turing-computable total function whose range
is a subset of the set of the Go¨del numbers of all Turing-computable
total functions. We prove that the second input cannot be set to the
Go¨del number of any Turing-computable function that computes the
output from any natural number in its first input. In this sense, there
is no Turing program that computes the output from its first input.
The procedure is used to define creative procedures which compute
functions that are not Turing-computable. We argue that creative
procedures model an aspect of reasoning that cannot be modeled by
Turing machines.
1 Introduction
There are doubts whether Turing machines can capture all reasoning pro-
cesses. For example, Turing [1939, pp. 200, 215] writes:
Go¨del’s theorem shows that such a system [intellectually satisfy-
ing system of logical inference] cannot be wholly mechanical ...
∗This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License (see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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The necessity for using the intuition is then [by the introduction
of a formal logic] greatly reduced by setting down formal rules
for carrying out inferences which are intuitively valid. ... In pre-
Go¨del times it was thought by some that it would probably be
possible to carry this programme to such a point that all the in-
tuitive judgments of mathematics could be replaced by a finite
number of these rules. The necessity for intuition would then be
entirely eliminated.
Thus, Turing [1939] interprets Go¨del’s theorem in the sense that an “intellec-
tually satisfying system of logical inference ... cannot be wholly mechanical”
and “all the intuitive judgments of mathematics” cannot “be replaced by a
finite number of these rules”, that is, “formal rules for carrying out inferences
which are intuitively valid”.
Turing [1936, p. 231] restricts his machines to a finite number of m-
configurations (machine configurations) which are called “states of mind” in
his [1936, pp. 249-250] substantiation of the thesis that his machines can
compute “all numbers which would naturally be regarded as computable”
(Turing’s thesis). Turing [1936, pp. 249-250] supposes that the “number of
states of mind” is finite because some of them “will be confused” if “we ad-
mitted an infinity of states of mind” (see Kleene [1952, pp. 376-377]). Go¨del
[1990, p. 306] regards the restriction to a finite number of states as a “philo-
sophical error in Turing’s work” and points out that “mental procedures”
may “go beyond mechanical procedures”. Go¨del [1990, p. 306] writes:
What Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, in its
use, is not static, but constantly developing, ... There may exist
systematic methods of actualizing this development, which could
form part of the procedure. Therefore, although at each stage
the number and precision of the abstract terms at our disposal
may be finite, both (and, therefore, also Turing’s number of dis-
tinguishable states of mind) may converge toward infinity in the
course of the application of the procedure.
Thus, Go¨del discusses the possible existence of “mental” procedures that
cannot be modeled by any Turing machine which is restricted to a finite
number of ”states of mind” in Turing’s [1936, pp. 249-250] substantiation of
his thesis.
Referring to his own form of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, Post [1944,
p. 295] writes:
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The conclusion is unescapable that even for such a fixed, well de-
fined body of mathematical propositions, mathematical thinking
is, and must remain, essentially creative.
Go¨del’s [1965a, p. 5] incompleteness theorem is based on “Principia Mathe-
matica and related systems”. Referring to his result that there is no finite
method deciding whether a sequence is generated by the operations of a
normal system Post [1965a, pp. 407-408] writes:
... the analysis ... is fundamentally weak in its reliance on the
logic of Principia Mathematica ... But for full generality a com-
plete analysis would have to be made of all possible ways in which
the human mind could set up finite processes for generating se-
quences.
Davis [1982b, p. 21] writes that Post “evidently felt that the very incom-
pleteness of ’Principia Mathematica’ ... undermined its suitability as a basis
for such an analysis.”
Turing’s, Go¨del’s and Post’s remarks suggest the possible existence of
”mental” procedures that cannot be reduced to Turing machines. Section 2
introduces an effective procedure that computes a total function. We prove
that a second input of the procedure cannot be set to the Go¨del number of
any Turing program that computes the output from any natural number in
its first input. The procedure concerns the question whether every proce-
dure used in an ”intelligent” system can be modeled by a Turing machine.
In particular, it concerns the question whether an ”intelligent” system can
model all its own functions by a Turing machine.
Section 3 uses the procedure in Section 2 to define creative procedures
which compute functions that are not Turing-computable. We argue that
creative procedures capture an aspect of Go¨del’s “mental procedures” which
are not Turing-computable. In Section 4 we discuss Church’s thesis.
2 Procedure
For his own form of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem Post [1944] introduced
creative sets whose definition implicitly refers to productive functions.1 We
1The term productive is due to Dekker [1955].
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regard the existence of productive functions as a key to the phenomenon of
incompleteness.
We deal with natural numbers, sets of natural numbers, and functions
from natural numbers to natural numbers. We use the following terminology
and notations: We write domain ϕ for the domain of a function ϕ and range ϕ
for the range of ϕ. A function is called partial if its domain is a subset of
the set all natural numbers. A function is called total if its domain is the set
of all natural numbers. If ϕ is a partial function of natural numbers, we say
that ϕ is defined at the natural number x if x ∈ domain ϕ.
Because Turing machines are represented as finite sets of instructions,
that is, as finite sequences of a fixed finite number of symbols, it is possible
to list the sets of instructions of all Turing machines by an algorithm, for
example, in ascending length according to the number of symbols that a set
of instructions contains. We follow Rogers [1987, p. 21] and keep such a
listing fixed for the remainder of this article:
Definition 1. The Turing program Pi is the set of instructions of a Turing
machine associated with the natural number i in a fixed listing of the sets of
instructions of all Turing machines. i is called the index or Go¨del number of
Pi. ϕi is the partial function determined by Pi. i is also called the index or
Go¨del number of ϕi.
The listing gives an algorithm for generating Pi from any natural number
i and another algorithm for generating a natural number i from the set of
instructions P of any Turing machine such that P is Pi. The two algorithms
can be encoded as ordinary computer programs.
A set of natural numbers is recursively enumerable if there is an algorithm
for enumerating its members. A precise definition is [Rogers, 1987, p. 58]:
Definition 2. A set of natural numbers is recursively enumerable if it is
empty or the range of a Turing-computable total function.
A set is called productive if there is a mechanical procedure (algorithm)
which, given any recursively enumerable subset, produces a member of the
set that is not contained in the given subset. A precise definition is:
Definition 3. A set S of natural numbers is productive if there is a Turing-
computable partial function ψ such that, given any total function ϕj whose
range is a subset of S, the value ψ(j) is defined and contained in S but not
in the range of ϕj :
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(∀j)[ϕj total & rangeϕj ⊆ S ⇒
[ψ(j) defined & ψ(j) ∈ S−rangeϕj ]]
The partial function ψ is called a productive partial function for S.
Definition 3 is equivalent to the definition of productive sets in Rogers
[1987, p. 84, see p. 90] because of basic theorems such as Rogers [1987, p. 60,
Theorem V, and p. 61, Corollary V(b)].
The following theorem states that the set {i|ϕi total} of the Go¨del num-
bers i of all (Turing-computable) total functions ϕi is productive. According
to Definition 3, this means that there is a Turing-computable partial func-
tion ψ, which is called productive, such that, given any (Turing-computable)
total function ϕj with range ϕj ⊆ {i|ϕi total}, the value ψ(j) is defined and
contained in {i|ϕi total} but not in the range of ϕj .
Theorem 1. The set {i|ϕi total} of the Go¨del numbers i of all total functions
ϕi is productive.
Proof. Let j be any natural number such that ϕj is a total function with
range ϕj ⊆ {i|ϕi total}, that is, the range of ϕj is a set of Go¨del numbers
of Turing-computable total functions. Thus, ϕϕj(n) is a Turing-computable
total function for any natural number n. Using Cantor’s diagonal method
we define a new function δj by
δj(n) = ϕϕj(n)(n) + 1 (1)
for all natural numbers n. Obviously, δj is a total function because ϕϕj(n) is
a total function for any natural number n.
In order to prove the theorem, we construct a Turing-computable proce-
dure computing a partial function ψ whose input is any natural number j
satisfying the properties that ϕj is a total and range ϕj ⊆ {i|ϕi total}. Such
a natural number j is given at the beginning of the proof and is used in the
definition of the function δj in (1). The output ψ(j) of the function ψ for
the input j is the Go¨del number ψ(j) of a Turing program Pψ(j) computing
the function δj in (1). The Go¨del number ψ(j) is constructed as follows:
According to Definition 1, the function ϕj in (1) is computed by the Tur-
ing program Pj and the function ϕϕj(n) in (1) is computed by the Turing
program Pϕj(n). The expression ϕϕj(n)(n) + 1 in (1) can be regarded as a
pseudo-code for a Turing program Pψ(j) which computes the function δj in
(1) and can be constructed from the Turing programs Pj and Pϕj(n), where
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ϕj(n) is the result of applying Pj to n. The construction of Pψ(j) from Pj
and Pϕj(n) can be achieved by a Turing-computable procedure that is inde-
pendent of the Go¨del number j because the states of Pj and Pϕj(n) (called
m-configurations, that is, machine configurations, in Turing [1936] and in-
ternal states in Rogers [1987, p. 13]) can be renamed such that Pj and Pϕj(n)
only contain different states and can thus be used as components of Pψ(j).
Because of Definition 1, the Go¨del number ψ(j) of Pψ(j) can be generated
from Pψ(j) by a Turing-computable procedure. From the Turing-computable
procedures producing ψ(j) from Pψ(j) and Pψ(j) from Pj and Pϕj(n) we can
construct a Turing-computable procedure that computes ψ(j) from the Go¨del
number j of any total function ϕj with range ϕj ⊆ {i|ϕi total}. Therefore,
ψ is a Turing-computable partial function that computes the Go¨del number
ψ(j) of a Turing program Pψ(j) computing the total function δj from the
Go¨del number j of any total function ϕj with range ϕj ⊆ {i|ϕi total} which
was given at the beginning of the proof.
Because of (1) the function δj is different from ϕϕj(n) for all natural num-
bers n. Because the Turing program Pψ(j), which computes ϕψ(j) according
to Definition 1, also computes the function δj in (1), δj(n) = ϕψ(j)(n) for
all natural numbers n. Therefore, the total function ϕψ(j) is different from
ϕϕj(n) for all natural numbers n. In particular, ψ(j) is different from ϕj(n)
for all natural numbers n because different functions ϕψ(j) and ϕϕj(n) cannot
have the same Go¨del number according to Definition 1. This implies that
ψ(j) is not contained in range ϕj, that is, the range of ϕj.
Therefore, ψ is a productive partial function for the set {i|ϕi total} of
the Go¨del numbers i of all total functions ϕi. In view of Definition 3 this
completes the proof of the theorem.
Rogers [1987, p. 84, Example 2] suggests another proof that the set
{i|ϕi total} is productive.
Definition 4. A recursively enumerable set S of natural numbers is creative
if its complement is productive.
Referring to Go¨del’s [1965a] incompleteness theorem, Rogers [1987, pp.
97-98] states that [the Go¨del numbers of] the provable well-formed formulas of
Peano arithmetic form a creative set, [the Go¨del numbers of] the unprovable
well-formed formulas form a productive set, and [the Go¨del numbers of] the
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true well-formed formulas of elementary arithmetic form a productive set.
Rogers [1987, p. 98] writes:
... no axiomatization of mathematics can exactly capture all true
statements in elementary arithmetic; and from any axiomatiza-
tion which yields only true statements in elementary arithmetic,
a new true statement can be found not provable in that axioma-
tization.
... Post believed that such facts manifest an essentially creative
quality of mathematics; hence the name creative set.
Soare [1978, p. 1151] writes:
Such r.e. [recursively enumerable] sets were called creative by Post
... because their existence ... implies the impossibility of mechan-
ically listing all statements true in such a fragment [fragment of
mathematics as elementary number theory].
The construction of undecidable formulas of formal systems in Go¨del’s
[1965a] incompleteness theorem can be represented by an algorithm. Produc-
tive functions (see Definition 3), which are Turing-computable, correspond
to a formal abstraction of this algorithm. Thus, the input of productive func-
tions corresponds to formal systems. This suggests that formal systems, in
particular, Turing programs, cannot refer to themselves, that is, they cannot
capture their own existence. Otherwise, the application of productive func-
tions, which correspond to the construction of the undecidable propositions,
could be used to “overcome” incompleteness as described below.
We use any productive function ψ for the set of the Go¨del numbers of
all Turing-computable total functions in Theorem 1 to define a procedure Q
which computes the output ω(x) of a total function ω for any natural number
x in its input and prove that function ω is not Turing-computable. The
procedure Q has a second input j which is in the domain of ψ and contains the
Go¨del number of a Turing program representing an existing formal system.
The function ω is not Turing-computable because Go¨del numbers ψ(j), where
j is an existing Go¨del number in the domain of ψ, are contained in the output
of the procedure Q, that is, the output of ω. Roughly speaking, there is no
Go¨del number j of a Turing program Pj generating all Go¨del numbers of
Turing-computable total functions that a human (or a “machine”) generates
if the human (or the “machine”) applies ψ to the existing Go¨del number
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1. l := least {n ∈ N | n /∈ domain α};
2. if is-set (j)
3. then α := α ∪ {(l, ψ(j))};
4. if is-not-set (x)
5. then return 1 ;
6. if x ∈ domain α
7. then return α(x);
8. α := α ∪ {(x, c)};
9. return α(x);
Table 1: Procedure Q with two inputs x and j and a global variable α for
computing ω(x)
j and thus produces the Go¨del number ψ(j) of a Turing-computable total
function that is not generated by Pj.
Definition 5. The procedure Q, whose pseudo-code is given in Table 1, has
two input variables x and j. The variable x is not set or set to any natural
number, that is, x has no value or the value of x is any natural number. The
variable j is not set or set to the Go¨del number of any Turing-computable
total function whose range is a subset of the set {i|ϕi total} of the Go¨del
numbers i of all total functions ϕi.
The global variable α in the procedure Q in Table 1 is set to the empty set
∅ before the first execution of the procedure Q. The variable α is a function
which is represented as a set of input-output pairs (x, y), that is, (x, y) ∈ α
means α(x) = y in ordinary notation. The variable α is only changed by the
procedure Q itself.
The first line of the procedure Q in Table 1 sets the variable l to the least
natural number n ∈ N that is not contained in the domain of the function α
which was set to the empty set ∅ before the first execution of the procedure
Q. The function ψ in the third line of the procedure Q is a productive
partial function for the productive set {i|ϕi total} of the Go¨del numbers i of
all total functions ϕi. Such a productive partial function ψ exists according
to Theorem 1 (see Definition 3). If the second input variable j is set (has a
value), that is, the condition in the second line of the procedure Q is satisfied,
the third line adds the input-output pair (l, ψ(j)) to the function α, which is
represented as a set of input-output pairs. If the first input variable x is not
set (has no value), that is, the condition in the fourth line of Q is satisfied,
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the fifth line returns 1 as the output of the procedure Q. If the condition
x ∈ domain α in the sixth line is satisfied, the procedure Q returns α(x) as its
output in the seventh line. Otherwise, the eighth line adds the input-output
pair (x, c) to the function α, where the constant c is the Go¨del number of any
fixed Turing-computable total function. Finally, the ninth line returns α(x),
which is equal to c because of the eighth line, as the output of the procedure
Q.
Theorem 2. All elementary operations of the procedure Q in Definition 5
and Table 1 are Turing-computable.
Proof. The least natural number n ∈ N that is not contained in the domain
of the function α in the first line in Table 1 is Turing-computable because α
is a finite set of input-output pairs at every point in time. The expression
ψ(j) in the second line in Table 1 is Turing-computable because j is the
Go¨del number of any Turing-computable total function whose range is a
subset of the set {i|ϕi total} of the Go¨del numbers i of all total functions ϕi
according to Definition 5, j is in the domain of ψ according to Definition 3
and Theorem 1, and ψ is Turing-computable according to Definition 3 and
Theorem 1. Obviously, the other elementary operations in the procedure Q
are also Turing-computable.
Theorem 3. The procedure Q in Definition 5 and Table 1 computes a total
function whose input is any natural number x in the first input of Q and
whose output is the output of Q, where the second input variable j of Q is
not set or set and may be changed at any time according to Definition 5.
Proof. The value α(x), where x is any natural number, in the seventh and the
ninth line in Table 1 is uniquely determined by the set α of input-output pairs
representing the function α: Let x, y1, and y2 be any natural numbers with
(x, y1) ∈ α and (x, y2) ∈ α. This implies y1 = y2 because of the construction
of α in the first and the third line and the extension of α in the eighth line
is only used if x /∈ domain α. Thus, the value α(x) is uniquely determined.
Therefore, the value ω(x) is uniquely determined because ω(x) = α(x) for
any natural number x ∈ domain α.
The procedure Q in Table 1 computes the value ω(x) of the function ω
for any natural number x because the input-output pair (x, c) is added to
α in the eighth line if x /∈ domain α. Therefore, the domain of the function
ω, which is computed by the procedure Q, is the set of all natural numbers,
that is, ω is a total function.
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Definition 6. We write ω for the total function computed by the procedure
Q according to Theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 4. The range of the total function ω in Definition 6 is a subset of
the set {i|ϕi total} of all Turing-computable total functions.
Proof. According to Definition 5 the second input j of the procedure Q in
Table 1 is not set or set to the Go¨del number of any Turing-computable total
function whose range is a subset of {i|ϕi total}. Thus, the value ψ(j) in the
third step of Q is the Go¨del number of a Turing-computable total function.
In the third step of Q, the value ψ(j) is used as an output of the function α.
According to Definition 5, the value c in the eighth step of Q is the Go¨del
number of a fixed Turing-computable total function. In the eighth step of
Q, the value c is used as an output of the function α. Thus, the range of
α is a subset of {i|ϕi total}. This implies that range of ω is a subset of
{i|ϕi total} because any member in the range of ω is contained in the range
of α according to the seventh and the ninth step of Q.
The following examples illustrate the computation of the function ω by
the procedure Q.
Example 1. According to Definition 5 the global variable α in the procedure
Q in Table 1 is set to the empty set ∅ before the first execution of the
procedure Q.
In order to compute, for example, the output ω(1) of the input 1 we apply
the procedure Q to the value 1 of its first input variable x. According to the
eighth line in Table 1, the input-output pair (1, c) is added to the function α
which is represented as a set of input-output pairs. According to the ninth
line in Table 1, the procedure Q returns
ω(1) = α(1) = c (2)
as the output ω(1) of the input 1.
In order to compute the output ω(5) of the input 5 we apply the procedure
Q to the value 5 of its first input variable x. Thus, the input-output pair
(5, c) is added to the function α and the procedure Q returns
ω(5) = α(5) = c (3)
as the output ω(5) of the input 5.
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Let j1 be the Go¨del number of any Turing-computable total function ϕj1
whose range is a subset of {i|ϕi total}. We apply the procedure Q to the
value j1 of its second input variable j. Because the value of j is set, the third
line in Table 1 adds the input-output pair (2, ψ(j1)) to the function α, where
2 = least {n ∈ N | n /∈ domain α} according to the first line in Table 1.
In order to compute the output ω(2) of the input 2 we apply the procedure
Q to the value 2 of its first input variable x. Because 2 ∈ domain α, the
procedure Q returns
ω(2) = α(2) = ψ(j1) (4)
as the output ω(2) of the input 2 according to the seventh line in Table 1.
Example 2. We set the global variable α in the procedure Q in Table 1 to
the empty set ∅ before the first execution of Q.
Let j1 be the Go¨del number of any Turing-computable total function ϕj1
whose range is a subset of {i|ϕi total}. We apply the procedure Q to the
value j1 of its second input variable j. Thus, the third line in Table 1 adds
the input-output pair (1, ψ(j1)) to the function α, where 1 is the least natural
number that is not contained in the domain of α according to the first line
in Table 1. Then, the computation of the output ω(1) yields
ω(1) = α(1) = ψ(j1). (5)
We construct a sequence of Go¨del numbers j2, j3, ... of Turing-computable
total functions ϕj2, ϕj3, ... as follows: Let k > 1 be any natural number. We
define a function ϕjk by ϕjk(1) = ψ(jk−1) and
ϕjk(x) = ϕjk−1(x− 1) (6)
for all natural numbers x > 1. Thus, the range of ϕjk contains ψ(jk−1) and
ϕjk−1(x) for any natural number x. Obviously, ϕjk is a Turing-computable
total function whose range is a subset of {i|ϕi total}.
The application the procedure Q to the value jk of its second input vari-
able j adds the input-output pair (k, ψ(jk)) to the function α. Therefore, the
computation of the output ω(k) yields
ω(k) = α(k) = ψ(jk) (7)
for any natural number k.
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The procedure Q in Table 1 contains two input variables x and j. If Q
is applied to any natural number x, Q produces an output ω(x), that is, Q
computes a total function. If ω were Turing-computable, there would be a
Turing program computing ω. The proof of the following theorem shows that
the input variable j of Q cannot be set to the Go¨del number of this Turing
program, that is, Pj, because the productive function ψ in Q is applied to
j and ψ(j) is used in the output of ω such that Theorem 1 precludes that
Pj computes ω. The condition in the following theorem entails that ψ(j) is
in the output of the function ω according to the third line of the procedure
Q. Therefore, the Turing program Pj does not compute ω because ψ(j) is
not contained in the output of Pj according to Theorem 1. An explanation
is that the Go¨del number ψ(j) can be used to construct a more powerful
Turing program that produces ψ(j) and all Go¨del numbers in the output
of Pj. Thus, Q can be used to construct more and more powerful Turing
programs.
Theorem 5. There is no Go¨del number j such that the Turing program
Pj computes the total function ω in Definition 6 if the procedure Q, which
computes the function ω according to Theorems 2 and 3, is applied to the
Go¨del number j of the Turing program Pj in its second input.
Proof. We assume that there is any natural number j such that the Turing
program Pj computes the total function ω in order to derive a contradiction.
Our assumption implies that
ω(x) = ϕj(x) (8)
for all natural numbers x because Pj also computes ϕj according to Definition
1. According to the condition in the theorem to be proved we apply the
procedure Q to the Go¨del number j of the Turing program Pj in its second
input. Because the range of the function ω is a subset of {i|ϕi total} according
to Theorem 4, j is the Go¨del number of a Turing-computable total function
whose range is a subset of {i|ϕi total}, that is, j is an admissible input of
the procedure Q in Definition 5. Because the second input variable j of the
procedure Q is set, that is, the condition in the second line of the procedure
Q in Table 1 is satisfied, the third line adds the input-output pair (l, ψ(j))
to the function α, that is,
α(l) = ψ(j), (9)
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where l = least {n ∈ N | n /∈ domain α} according to the first line in Table 1.
Because of (9), l ∈ domain α and
ω(l) = α(l) = ψ(j) (10)
because of the seventh line in Table 1. Because of (8),
ω(l) = ϕj(l). (11)
This implies that ψ(j) is contained in the range of the function ϕj. According
to Theorem 1 the value ψ(j) is not contained in the range of the function
ϕj. Thus, we have derived a contradiction from our original assumption that
any Turing program Pj computes the total function ω. Therefore, there is no
Turing program Pj, where j is any natural number, that computes the total
function ω.
The condition ”if the procedure Q ...” in Theorem 5 can be implemented
by the following if-then rule:
Rule 1. If j is the Go¨del number of a Turing program Pj that computes a
total function whose range is a subset of {i|ϕi total}, then apply the procedure
Q in Definition 5 to x and j, where the value of the input variable x is not
set.
If Rule 1 is applied, the condition ”if the procedure Q ... in its second
input” in Theorem 5 is satisfied. This implies that there is no Turing pro-
gram Pj, where j is any natural number, computing the total function ω in
Definition 6.
The condition in Rule 1 may be modified. For example, the condition
may require a formal proof that Pj “computes a total function whose range
is a subset of {i|ϕi total}.”
3 Discussion
The proofs of Theorems 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Section 2 constitute precise evidence
that all elementary operations of the procedure Q in Table 1 are Turing-
computable and the total function ω, which is computed by the procedure
Q, is not Turing-computable. The theorems are independent of the special
productive function ψ of the procedure Q in Table 1, that is, Theorems 2,
3, 4, and 5 remain valid if the procedure Q in Table 1 uses any productive
function. This suggests the following definition:
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Definition 7. A procedure, whose elementary operations are computable
by Turing programs, is called creative if it computes functions that are not
computable by Turing programs.
According to Theorems 2 and 3 the procedure Q computes the total func-
tion ω in Definition 6 which is not Turing-computable according to Theorem
5. This means that the procedure Q is creative in the sense of Definition 7.
Rule 1 in Section 2 provides Go¨del numbers j of Turing programs Pj
that compute total functions whose range is a subset of {i|ϕi total}, that
is, existing information, in the input of the procedure Q but these Go¨del
numbers j cannot completely be represented in Q because the set {i|ϕi total}
is productive. The procedure Q is creative according to Definition 7 because
Q computes the function ω which is not Turing-computable. Thus, Rule 1 is
an implementation of the following general principle for creative procedures:
Existence Principle. Existing information, for example, Go¨del numbers of
Turing programs, is provided in the input of procedures which are creative
according to Definition 7 if the information cannot completely be represented
in the procedure.
The existence principle, in particular, Rule 1, can be implemented phys-
ically, that is, in a “machine”. Let
L(j), (12)
where j is any natural number, be formal propositions that stand for the
condition “j is the Go¨del number of a Turing program Pj that computes a
total function whose range is a subset of {i|ϕi total}” in Rule 1, that is, L in
(12) refers to a fixed finite string. The formal proposition L(j) has a physical
representation. Rule 1 is applied if the proposition L(j) in (12), in particular,
the Go¨del number j, is generated physically. The existence principle simply
implies that existing information, which is available physically, is provided
in the input of creative procedures such as the procedure Q in Table 1. In
view of the results described previously, this means that the function ω can
neither be modeled by any Turing machine nor be dealt within a formal
system although the computation of ω can be implemented physically, that
is, in a “machine”.
The function α in the procedure Q represents the function ω in the sense
that the input-output pairs in α are a finite subset of the input-output pairs
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of ω (see Definition 5 and Table 1 in Section 2). But there is no Go¨del
number for the function ω, which is computed by Q, because input-output
pairs (l, ψ(j)) and (x, c) may be added to the function α whenever Q is
executed.
Referring to his “Theorem 2.4, with its corollaries” Davis [1982a, pp.
121-122] writes:
... these results really constitute an abstract form of Go¨del’s fa-
mous incompleteness theorem ... they imply that an adequate
development of the theory of natural numbers, within a logic L,
to the point where membership in some given set Q of integers
can be adequately dealt with within the logic ... is possible only if
Q happens to be recursively enumerable. Hence, non-recursively
enumerable sets can, at best, be dealt with in an incomplete man-
ner.
This implies that the function ω, which is computed by the procedure Q,
cannot be dealt with within a logic, that is, a formal system because the
range of ω is not recursively enumerable according to Theorem 5.
Let R be any Turing program that generates any sequence of Go¨del num-
bers
j1, j2, ... (13)
of Turing programs Pj1, Pj2, ... computing total functions whose range is a
subset of {i|ϕi total}, that is, R successively generates the Go¨del numbers
j1, j2, ... in (13).
2 Rule 1 applies the procedure Q in Table 1 to any Go¨del
number in (13) as soon as such a Go¨del number is generated. Rule 1 also
processes Go¨del numbers that are not generated by the Turing program R,
that is, if the Go¨del number, say jk, of any Turing program Pjk computing
a total function is generated whose range is a subset of the set {i|ϕi total},
then Rule 1 applies the procedure Q in Table 1 to jk. Thus, according to
Theorem 5 in Section 2 there is no Go¨del number jk such that Pjk computes
the total function ω in Definition 6.
If the Go¨del numbers j in the input of Rule 1 are restricted to the Go¨del
numbers j1, j2, ... in (13), which are generated by the Turing program R, the
range of the total function ω in Theorem 5 is recursively enumerable. But
such a restriction restricts the input of Rule 1 to a recursively enumerable
2The sequence of Go¨del numbers j1, j2, ... in Example 2 in Section 2 can be generated
by such a Turing program R.
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subset of the set {i|ϕi total} and thus restricts the generality of Rule 1 be-
cause the set {i|ϕi total} is productive. This means that the inputs of Rule
1 cannot be restricted to a recursively enumerable subset of {i|ϕi total} be-
cause a productive function ψ for {i|ϕi total} could be applied to a Go¨del
number j of a Turing program generating this subset and thus produce the
Go¨del number ψ(j) of a Turing-computable function that is contained in
{i|ϕi total} but not in this subset. Thus, the range of the total function ω
in Theorem 5 is not recursively enumerable because the inputs of Rule 1
cannot be restricted to a recursively enumerable subset of the productive set
{i|ϕi total}.
Rogers [1987, pp. 10–11] discusses “the problem of getting a satisfactory
[formal] characterization of algorithm and algorithmic function” because the
application of diagonalization to a list of total algorithmic functions yields a
total algorithmic function that is not contained in the list (see the proof of
Theorem 1 in Section 2). Rogers [1987, pp. 11–12] writes:
We can avoid the diagonalization difficulty by allowing sets of in-
structions for nontotal partial functions as well as for total func-
tions. ... The approach taken by way of partial functions is,
in essence, the approach taken by Kleene ..., Church ..., Turing
[1936] and others in the 1930’s.
Referring to “the concept of general recursiveness (or Turing’s computabil-
ity)” Go¨del [1965c, p. 84] writes:
... with this concept one has for the first time succeeded in giving
an absolute definition of an interesting epistemological notion,
i.e., one not depending on the formalism chosen. In all other
cases treated previously, such as demonstrability ... it is clear
that the one obtained is not the one looked for. ... By a kind
of miracle ... the diagonal procedure does not lead outside the
defined notion.
Thus, there is only a formal characterization of a single “interesting epis-
temological notion”, that is, the Turing-computable partial functions. In
contrast, creative procedures provide a framework for an investigation of
other “notions” such as Turing-computable total functions. This framework
is not subject to a “diagonalization difficulty” but uses diagonalization to
investigate such “notions” which cannot be captured by formal systems.
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Discussing the formalization of a theory which results in a formal system,
Kleene [1952, p. 64] writes:
Metamathematics must study the formal system as a system of
symbols, etc. which are considered wholly objectively. This means
simply that those symbols, etc. are themselves the ultimate ob-
jects, and are not being used to refer to something other than
themselves. The metamathematician looks at them, not through
and beyond them; thus they are objects without interpretation
or meaning.
Referring to his undecidable formula Ap(p) in Go¨del’s incompleteness theo-
rem Kleene [1952, p. 426] writes:
... if we suppose the number-theoretic formal system to be con-
sistent, we can recognize that Ap(p) is true by taking into view
the structure of that system as a whole, though we cannot recog-
nize the truth of Ap(p) by use only of the principles of inference
formalized in that system, i.e. not ⊢ Ap(p).
3
Thus, Go¨del’s theorem requires a reference to the (incomplete) formal “sys-
tem as a whole” which cannot be achieved within the formal system itself
because, in our interpretation, the formal system cannot take “into view the
structure of that system as a whole”, that is, “wholly objectively”. In par-
ticular, a formal system represented by a Turing program cannot take “into
view the structure of that” Turing program “as a whole”, that is, “wholly
objectively”, in the sense that the Turing program, which produces a (recur-
sively enumerable) subset of a productive set, cannot refer to itself and thus
capture the result of applying a productive partial function for the productive
set to its own Go¨del number.
The assumption that all reasoning processes can be modeled by a Turing
program (see Section 1) immediately yields a contradiction if the following
if-then rule, which is also an implementation of the existence principle, is
used:
Rule 2. If j is the Go¨del number of a Turing program Pj that computes
a total function whose range is a subset of {i|ϕi total}, then ψ(j), where ψ
3The expression “not ⊢ Ap(p)” in Kleene [1952] means that the undecidable formula
Ap(p) in Go¨del’s theorem is not provable in the formal system.
17
is a productive partial function for {i|ϕi total}, is the Go¨del number of a
Turing-computable total function, that is, ϕψ(j) is a total function.
Rule 2 is an immediate implication of Theorem 1 in Section 2. A pseudo-code
for Rule 2 is
if L(j) then T (ψ(j)), (14)
where L(j) is a formal proposition which stands for the condition “j is the
Go¨del number of a Turing program Pj ... a subset of {i|ϕi total}” in Rule
2 and T (j) is a formal proposition which stands for the consequent “ψ(j)
... is the Go¨del number of a Turing-computable total function” in Rule 2,
that is, L and T in (14) refer to fixed finite strings. If we assume that all
reasoning processes can be modeled by a Turing program, say Pk, then Pk
computes a total function whose range is the subset of {i|ϕi total} containing
all members of {i|ϕi total} that are generated by Pk. Let j be the Go¨del
number j of a Turing program Pj that computes this total function. The use
of Rule 2, which is an implementation of the existence principle, implies that
a formal representation (14) of Rule 2 and a formal representation L(t) of its
condition are contained in the Turing program Pk which is assumed to model
all reasoning processes. The application of (14) to L(t) by the Turing program
Pk yields the consequent T (ψ(j)) in (14). Thus, we have a contradiction
because, according to Theorem 1 in Section 2, ψ(j) is not contained in the
range of ϕj which contains all members of {i|ϕi total} that are generated
by Pk. These considerations also apply to the “reasoning processes” of a
“machine” or “robot” because, as described above, the existence principle,
in particular, Rules 1 and 2, can be implemented physically.
As discussed above, a restriction of the input of Rule 1 to a recursively
enumerable subset of {i|ϕi total} restricts the generality of Rule 1. The
use of Rule 2, which is an implementation of the existence principle, also
implies that such a restriction restricts the generality of Rule 1 because the
application of Rule 2 to the Go¨del number j of a Turing-computable total
function whose range is the subset of {i|ϕi total} yields the Go¨del number
ψ(j) of a Turing-computable total function that is not contained in this
subset but satisfies the condition in Rule 1. A proof that j is the Go¨del
number of a Turing-computable total function whose range is the subset of
{i|ϕi total} can be extended to a proof that ψ(j) is the Go¨del number of a
Turing-computable total function and not contained in this subset because
ψ is a productive partial function.
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No formal system can capture its own existence in the sense that every
Turing program representing a formal system and generating (recursively
enumerable) subsets of productive sets cannot generate the result of apply-
ing productive partial functions for the productive sets to the Go¨del numbers
of Turing programs producing these subsets (see Theorem 1 in Section 2 and
the quotation from Davis [1982a, pp. 121-122] above). This implies that a
Turing program generating a (recursively enumerable) subset of a productive
set cannot contain a reference to its own Go¨del number because a productive
function for the productive set could be applied to such a reference such that
the original Turing program could contain the output of the productive func-
tion. The incompleteness of formal systems is “overcome” by the existence
principle which can be implemented in rules such as Rule 1. Roughly speak-
ing, this principle implies that existing information is provided in the input
of creative procedures and thus “overcomes” the incompleteness of formal
systems and the limits of Turing’s computability.4 Thus, the second input
variable j in the procedure Q in Table 1 is required because formal systems
including Turing programs cannot refer to existing information such as their
own Go¨del numbers.
4 Related Work
Church’s [1965, pp. 90, 100-102] thesis5 states that every effectively calculable
function is general recursive, that is, computable by a Turing machine (see
Kleene [1952, pp. 300–301, 317–323]). Since “effective calculability” is an
intuitive concept, the thesis cannot be proved (see Kleene [1952, p. 317]).6
Referring to Go¨del’s [1965a] incompleteness theorem and Church’s [1965,
pp. 90, 100-102] identification of effective calculability with recursiveness,
Post [1965b, p. 291, footnote 8] writes:
“Actually the work already done by Church and others carries this
identification considerably beyond the working hypothesis stage.
4Post [1965a, p. 423] writes: “What we must now do is to isolate the creative germ in
the thinking process.”
5The term Church’s thesis is due to Kleene [1965, p. 274] (see Kleene [1952, pp. 300,
317]).
6In his article “Why Go¨del Didn’t Have Church’s Thesis” Davis [1982b, p. 22, footnote
26] writes: “We are not concerned here with attempts to distinguish ’mechanical proce-
dures’ (to which Church’s thesis is held to apply) from a possible broader class of ’effective
procedures’ ...”
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But to mask this identification under a definition hides the fact
that a fundamental discovery in the limitations of the mathemati-
cizing power of Homo Sapiens has been made and blinds us to
the need of continual verification.”
Thus, Post calls for a “continual verification” of Church’s thesis because of
the incompleteness of formal systems (see Section 1).
Referring to Principia Mathematica (see Go¨del [1965a]) and his normal
systems, Post [1965a, p. 408] writes (see Section 1):
... for full generality a complete analysis would have to be made
of all possible ways in which the human mind could set up finite
processes for generating sequences.
In our view, the existence principle can be used by the “human mind” because
existing information, for example, a Turing machine representing a formal
system, must be a constituent of the “human mind”, that is, a constituent
of reasoning. Thus, the “human mind” can apply an implementation of the
existence principle, for example, Rule 1, and the procedure Q in Table 1 in
Section 2 to “set up finite processes for generating sequences” which cannot
be computed by any Turing program according to Theorem 5. This means
that a formal system cannot deal with a fundamental aspect of reasoning
because it cannot refer to its own existence.
The function ω, which is computed by the procedure Q in Table 1 in
Section 2, can be regarded as effectively calculable because the elementary
operations of Q are Turing-computable according to Theorem 2 and Rule 1,
which uses the procedure Q, can be implemented physically.
The condition ”if the procedure Q ...” in Theorem 5 is satisfied if Rule
1 in Section 3 is applied. Rule 1 is an implementation of the existence prin-
ciple, which states that existing information, for example, Go¨del numbers
of Turing-computable total functions whose range is a subset of all Turing-
computable total functions, that is, recursively enumerable subsets of a pro-
ductive set, is provided in the input of creative procedures which contain
a productive function for the productive set. Thus, Church’s thesis is not
valid if the existence principle is applied to recursively enumerable subsets
of productive sets and suitable procedures.
Church [1965, pp. 90, 102] presents his thesis as a “definition of effective
calculability” and proposes a second definition of effective calculability:
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... (2) by defining a function F (of positive integers) to be ef-
fectively calculable if, for every positive integer m, there exists a
positive integer n such that F (m) = n is a provable theorem.
If we require for every input j of the procedure Q in Table 1 a formal proof
that the Turing program Pj computes a total function (see the modification
of Rule 1 in Section 2), then, for every natural number (positive integer) x
in the input of Q, which computes the function ω(x), there exists a natural
number y such that ω(x) = y is a provable theorem in some formal system,
say Sx. Such a formal system also exists for any finite set of natural numbers
x in the input of Q. But, because of Theorem 5 in Section 2, there exists
no formal system S such that ω(x) = y, where y is a natural number, is
a provable theorem in S for all natural numbers x.7 Roughly speaking,
Theorem 5 implies that the formal systems Sx cannot be unified into a single
formal system S.
In a letter of June 8, 1937, to Pepis Church wrote (see Sieg [1997, pp.
175–176]):
... if a numerical function f is effectively calculable then for every
positive integer a there must exist a positive integer b such that
a valid proof can be given of the proposition f(a) = b ...
Therefore to discover a function which was effectively calcula-
ble but not general recursive would imply discovery of an ut-
terly new principle of logic, not only never before formulated,
but never before actually used in a mathematical proof - since all
extant mathematics is formalizable within the system of Principia
[Mathematica], or at least within one of its known extensions.
As far as we know the existence principle was “never before actually used in
a mathematical proof”.
The function α in the procedure Q in Definition 5 and Table 1, which
is represented as a set of input-output pairs, is a subset of the input-output
pairs of the function ω. Q returns α(x) as the output of ω(x) for any natural
number x in the first input of Q, that is, the input of ω. Nevertheless,
the set α of input-output pairs, which is the empty set ∅ before the first
7Here, we implicitly assume that the formal system S is represented by a Turing ma-
chine and a Go¨del number for the recursively enumerable subset of {i|ϕi total} produced
by S is generated such that Theorem 5 and Rule 1 are applicable.
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execution of Q, is finite at every point in time. Obviously, each set α of
input-output pairs can be generated by a Turing machine. Thus, the number
of states of Turing programs generating α is finite “at each stage” of its
development but according to Theorem 5 there is no Go¨del number of a
Turing program computing ω, that is, α “at each stage” of its development
(see Go¨del [1990, p. 306] and Section 1). This means that the number of
states of the Turing machines generating α will not be “confused” by an
“infinity of states of mind” because this number of states is finite “at each
stage” of the development of α, that is, the development of ω (see Turing
[1936, pp. 249–250] and Section 1).8
Referring to Church’s thesis and Go¨del’s “mental procedures” Kleene
[1987, pp. 493, 494] writes:
For, in the idea of “effective calculability” or of an “algorithm”
as I understand it, it is essential that all of the infinitely many
calculations ... are performable ... by following a set of instruc-
tions fixed in advance of all the calculations. If the Turing ma-
chine representation is used, this includes there being only a finite
number of “internal machine configurations”, corresponding to a
finite number of a human computer’s mental states. ... As Turing
... says ..., “If we admitted an infinity of states of mind, some
of them will be ‘arbitrarily close’ and will be confused.” Hardly
appropriate for keeping things straight digitally!
... an effective (finitely describable) procedure from the begin-
ning, coming under the Church-Turing thesis.
In our view, the descriptions of the procedure Q in Section 2 and Rule 1 in
Section 3 are “fixed” at the beginning and “finite” at every point in time but
8We suppose Turing’s [1936, pp. 249–250] infinity is an infinity according to a mathe-
matical definition. For example, a definition states that a set is infinite if it is not finite.
Another definition states that a set A is Dedekind-infinite if some proper subset B of A is
equinumerous to A, that is, there is a bijection (one-to-correspondence) between A and B.
In Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory this definition is equivalent to the condition that a set A is
infinite if there is a one-to-one correspondence between all natural numbers and a subset
of A. The number of states of the Turing machines generating α is not finite and seems
to be “unbounded” because there is no Turing machine generating α “at each stage” of
its development if Rule 1 is applied. Hilbert [1983, pp. 183-186] writes: ”... the infinite,
as that concept is used in mathematics, has never been completely clarified ... the infinity
in the sense of an infinite totality, where we still find it used in deductive methods, is an
illusion. ... no other concept needs clarification more it does.”
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the function α in the procedure Q develops in the course of time because it
depends on the input variables x and j of Q, that is, the functions α and ω
cannot be described ”in advance” because the set of the Go¨del numbers of
the Turing-computable total functions is productive. As described above, the
number of states of Turing machines generating the function α will not be
“confused” by an “infinity of states of mind” because this number of states
is finite “at each stage” of the development of α, that is, the development of
ω (see Turing [1936, pp. 249–250] and Section 1).
The proof of Theorem 1 in Section 2 states that the Go¨del number ψ(j)
of the total function ϕψ(j) is not contained in the range of ϕj, where j is any
natural number such that ϕj is a total function with range ϕj ⊆ {i|ϕi total}.
In particular, the proof states that the total function ϕψ(j) is different from
ϕϕj(n) for all natural numbers n. This means that the productive function ψ
produces not only a new Go¨del number ψ(j), which is different from ϕj(n) for
all natural numbers n, but also a new total function ϕψ(j), which is different
from all total functions ϕϕj(n) for all natural numbers n.
Go¨del [1990, p. 306] writes (see Section 1):
... mind ... is not static, but constantly developing, ...
If creative procedures and the existence principle are used, ”mind” is ”con-
stantly developing” in the sense that it produces new structures from existing
structures. For example, the use of Rule 1, which is an implementation of
the existence principle, produces a new Go¨del number ψ(j) in the creative
procedure Q whenever any natural number j such that ϕj is a total function
with range ϕj ⊆ {i|ϕi total} is generated. As described above, ϕψ(j) is a new
total function which is different from all total functions ϕϕj(n) for all natural
numbers n.9
9All existing structures in a creative procedure are called “reflection base”. The re-
peated application of the existence principle, that is, the repeated application of a creative
procedure to information in its reflection base, can be regarded as a feedback process which
produces more and more powerful structures. A first step towards the implementation of
a creative procedure is described in Ammon [1988], Ammon [1992], and Ammon [1993].
These experiments suggest that creative procedures are a self-developing process which
can start from any universal programming language. Their structure can be regarded
as a web of concepts and methods which are called “analytical spaces” and cannot be
characterized formally. This is plausible because formal systems are restricted to Turing-
computable partial functions, that is, recursively enumerable sets (see the quotations from
Davis [1982a, pp. 121-122], Rogers [1987, pp. 11–12], and Go¨del [1965c, p. 84] in Section 3).
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Lucas [1961] argues that mind cannot be modeled by a Turing machine
because he knows that the undecidable proposition in Go¨del’s theorem is true
(see Shapiro [1998, pp. 273-274]). Putnam points out that Lucas cannot prove
the prerequisite of consistency in Go¨del’s theorem (see Shapiro [1998, pp. 282-
284]). The procedure Q and Rule 1 in Section 2 can be executed by a human
and by a “machine” to compute the function ω. According to Theorem 5
there is no Turing machine computing ω. Thus, an implementation of the
existence principle, which merely uses the existence of a formal system, that
is, a Turing machine itself, “overcomes” its incompleteness, that is, the limits
of the Turing machine.10 Referring to Penrose [1990], Davis [1993, p. 611]
writes:
However, it [Go¨del’s theorem] is a quite ordinary sentence of el-
ementary number theory and can be proved with no difficulty
whatever in any formal system adequate for elementary number
theory, such as for example Peano arithmetic. Note that this pow-
erful form of Go¨del’s theorem applies uniformly to any formalism
whatever.
Although Go¨del’s theorem applies to any (given) “formalism”11 and can be
proved in a “formal system”, no proof of Go¨del’s theorem in any “formal
system” can apply to this “formal system” itself because, as described above,
no “formal system” can refer to itself, that is, to its own existence. Rather,
a proof of Go¨del’s theorem for a “formalism”, that is, “formal system”, say
S1, requires another extended “formal system”, say S2, which refers to S1, a
proof of Go¨del’s theorem for S2, requires another extended “formal system”,
say S3, which refers to S2, and so on.
12 Thus, there is no proof in any formal
10Go¨del [1965b, pp. 71–72] writes: “... due to A.M. Turing’s work, a precise and unques-
tionably adequate definition of the general concept of formal system can now be given, ...
Turing’s work gives an analysis of the concept of ’mechanical procedure’ (alias ’algorithm’
...). This concept is shown to be equivalent with that of a ’Turing machine’. A formal
system can simply be defined to be any mechanical procedure for producing formulas,
called provable formulas.
11Originally, Go¨del [1965a] proved his theorem for the “formalism” of “Principia Math-
ematica and related systems”.
12In particular, a reference to “any formalism whatever” cannot be formalized. For ex-
ample, a Turing program generating a (recursively enumerable) subset of a productive set,
is a “formalism”, that is, a formal system. A formal reference to all these Turing programs
does not exist because productive sets are not recursively enumerable. Mendelson [1964,
p. 253] writes that there are 2ℵ0 productive sets, that is, the cardinality of the productive
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system showing that Go¨del’s theorem applies “to any formalism whatever”.
Therefore, the “insight” that Go¨del’s theorem applies “to any formalism
whatever” requires a new principle such as the existence principle which
cannot be formalized although it can be implemented physically.
5 Conclusion
We described a procedure that computes a total function whose range can
contain members of a productive set. The elementary operations of the pro-
cedure are Turing-computable. We proved that there is no Turing program
computing this total function if the existence principle is used which im-
plies that existing recursively enumerable subsets of the productive set are
provided in the second input of the procedure. The existence principle can
be implemented in rules which can be executed by humans and “machines”.
Roughly speaking, a formal system cannot contain a reference to itself and an
extension of the recursively enumerable sets that it deals with by productive
functions. In view of the existence principle, this means that a formal system
cannot deal with a fundamental aspect of reasoning, that is, it cannot cap-
ture its own existence. Church’s thesis is not valid if the existence principle
is applied to recursively enumerable subsets of productive sets and suitable
procedures. We defined creative procedures which compute functions that
are not computable by Turing machines and argued that creative procedures
model an aspect of reasoning that cannot be modeled by Turing machines.
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